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INTERFERENCE WITH THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF
NAVIGATION AND THE RIPARIAN OWNER'S
CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
SHELDON J. PLAGER*
Entering a navigable body of water from the upland, and navigating
from the point of access to distant points on the same body of water or
points on connecting bodies of water, are, for practical purposes, a continua-
tion of the same act. Yet they involve significantly different legal concepts
and raise significantly different issues. The problems resulting from inter-
ference with a riparian owner's right of access to and from his upland are
examined in Part I of this article; those involving his right to travel once
he has obtained access are the subject of Part II.
I. AccEss
A. Generally
The act of entering and leaving a navigable water body typically
involves use of the adjacent upland. A stranger who attempts to gain
access to the water body by crossing privately-owned upland ordinarily
commits a trespass; the right of access across his upland belongs only to
the upland owner. If this right is interfered with or materially hindered
by others, the courts do not hesitate to protect the upland owner's right.'
Like all "rights," the right of access is not absolute. An occasional
close case may go against the riparian because the court is not convinced
he has really been hurt,2 or because the court feels that some interference
was an unavoidable result of the exercise of this right by others, or of equally
important public rights. Cases of the latter type require the courts to
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n. v. Whites River Inspectors' &
Shippers' Ass'n., 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909); Turner v. Holland, 54 Mich. 300, 20
N.W. 51 (1884), aff'd, 65 Mich. 453, 33 N.W. 283 (1887); Delaplaine v. Chicago
& N.W. R.R., 42 Wis. 214 (1877); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Slade Lumber Co., 61
Wash. 195, 112 P. 240 (1910). See Annot., 21 ALR 206-11 (1922); 56 Am. Jur.
Waters, §§ 216-17 (1947). See also 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGnTS 297 (904).
2. E.g., Duval Eng'r. and Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954)
(Bridge constructed across river in front of plaintiffs' upland. Decree for plaintiffs,
holding unlawful interference with riparian rights including right of access, reversed:
"It is not shown that these have been materially disturbed." Id. at 434).
(608)
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weigh the policies in support of the riparian's exclusive right against the
policies which are in conflict with it, and to strike a balance between them.
For example, in Sherlock v. Bainbridge,3 neighboring riparians had each
constructed wharves out to the channel for the purpose of servicing steamers
using the river. Occasionally the river current swung a steamer, tied to one
of the wharves, in such a way that it blocked other vessels from reaching
the neighboring wharf. On complaint by neighboring dock owner against
the owner of a vessel which blocked his wharf in this fashion, the court
held that in the absence of a showing of negligence in the manner in
which the vessel was moored, there was no liability for interference with
access. The public right of navigation included the right to stop where
required by the purposes of the navigation for a reasonable time to take
on and discharge passengers and cargo. The vessels were free to choose
between wharves competing for their business. If in doing this some block-
age occurred, it was incident to the primary right of navigation, and not
actionable.4
Another example of conflicting policies, in which the upland owner's
claim to exclusive use is subordinated to a more basic claim, is the situa-
tion of the vessel whose personnel or cargo are placed in sudden peril,
necessitating that it be beached or some other use of the upland be made.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be expected that the navigator will
obtain permission prior to landing. He will not be liable for failure to
obtain permission if he acts reasonably under the circumstances and no
substantial injury to the upland owner's interests result.5
B. Governmnt Improuements "in aid of navigatioi'
When the riparian owner's access is materially impaired or is totally
cut off as a result of government improvements to the water body, the
balance becomes harder to strike. This situation differs from those dis-
cussed above in several significant ways. First, the upland owner's access
is typically hindered or destroyed permanently, rather than temporarily
3. 41 Ind. 35 (1872).
4. See also Cohn v. The Wausau Boom Co., 47 Wis. 314, 2 N.W. 546 (1879)
(log boom and pilings interferred with upland owner's access to river; no re-
covery, on theory that the Boom Company, a quasi-public corporation, had
done no more than erect a lawful improvement to navigation); cf. A. C. Conn Co.
v. Little Suamico Lumber Mfg. Co., 74 Wis. 652, 43 N.W. 660 (1889) (dispute
between party using the river for transporting logs and other party who maintained
a dam in the river for water power to run a mill).
5. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). See also Proctor
-v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873).
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or intermittently. Second, the effecting agency is the government, rather
than a private individual. The third difference, a corollary to the second,
is that the particular construction presumably has as its purpose an "im-
provement in aid of navigation." This is the government's justification for
its activity. In the absence of a state constitutional provision limiting its
power to act," and subject to the overriding power of the federal govern-
ment, a state under its sovereign powers has the authority not only to
regulate its navigable waters, but to authorize and participate in programs
for improving them.7 The federal government, under various provisions of
the U. S. Constitution, has the power to effect improvements to naviga-
tion in waters subject to federal jurisdiction. Both state and federal gov-
ernments, in pursuance of these powers, have engaged in activities that
have cut off upland owners from the navigable channels, and the courts
have been called upon to balance their interests. "Balancing" here is per-
haps a misnomer. The activities involved typically result in virtually com-
plete destruction of the riparian's access. But, given the power of the
government to undertake improvements, the fact that private interests
are adversely affected does not prevent the government from acting. If a
balance is to be struck, it must be done in terms of pecuniary compensa-
tion to the upland owner.
The federal government was early absolved by the U. S. Supreme
Court from the duty to recompense the upland owner for destruction of his
access resulting from a federal project. The leading case is Scranton v
Wheeler,8 decided in 1900. A full discussion of the plenary power of the
federal government over navigable waters, and the long-range impact and
6. A number of states have had or presently have constitutional provisions
limiting or denying the power of the state to engage in internal improvements.
These provisions have been construed to prohibit state participation in improve-
ments to navigable waters. See, e.g., Wisc. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 10, construed in
State v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 91 N.W. 115 (1902) (State appropriation of
$20,000 for construction of levees held invalid); MINN. CONST., art. 9, § 5, con-
strued in Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N.W. 331 (1894). But see Visina v.
Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89 N.W. 2d 635 (1958) (approving state participation in
port development on theory that this was a "governmental function," and not
within the constitutional proscription). The relevant provision of the Michigan
Constitution, art X, § 14 (1908), was amended in 1946 to permit the state to
engage in development and improvement of waterways and water bodies.
7. See, e.g., Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 245,
(1829) (State-authorized dam, obstructing navigation, not unlawful when Congress
neither authorized nor prohibited it).
8. 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (Federal government in course of improving Sault Ste.
Marie erected a pier in front of privately-held upland, cutting off access to channel;
held, no liability). For the earlier history of the case, see 57 F. 803 (6th Cir.
1893), rev'd for lack of jurisdiction, 163 U.S. 703 (1896).
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implications of cases like Scranton v. Wheeler, is beyond the scope of this
discussion. For purposes of the discussion here, it will be sufficient to note
that the Court's theory was that there had been no "taking" of property,
and hence no duty to pay compensation. The riparian owner acquired the
right of access subject to the possibility that such right might become
worthless "in consequence of the erection under competent authority of
structures on the submerged lands in front of his property for the
purpose of improving navigation." 9
This result was contrary to the position earlier taken by the English
House of Lords in Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co.10 Under the authority of the
conservators of the River Thames, a fill was to be made in the river bank in
such a way as to cut off access to a portion of plaintiff's wharf. The House
of Lords held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation under the
relevant statutes" because the right of access was a form of enjoyment of
the land as well as the water.
It appears to me impossible to say that a mode of enjoyment of
land on the bank of a navigable river which is thus valuable, and
as to which a landowner can thus protect himself against disturb-
ance, is otherwise than a right or claim to which the owner of
land on the bank of the river is by law entitled within the meaning
of such a saving clause as that which I have read.' 2
The state courts which have faced the question have generally followed
the lead of the U. S. Supreme Court, particularly when the construction
was undertaken by a state agency and resulted in an improvement to the
waterway itself.13 When the improvement was carried out by someone
other than a state agency, and did not actually improve the waterway
9. Id. at 164.
10. 1 App. Cas. 662 (1876).
11. There is no constitutional basis for compensation in England, but the
various statutes providing for improvements to navigation typically provide com-
pensation for property taken.
12. Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., 1 App. Cas. 662, 672 (1876).
13. E.g., Henry Dalton & Sons Co. v. Oakland, 168 Cal. 463, 143 P. 721
(1914) (city sea wall constructed in front of upland, blocking access; held, no
compensable right of access to deep water over intervening tideland); Home For
Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909) (Common-
wealth of Massachusetts erected a sea wall in front of upland owner's property
which cut him off from access to the navigable water; compensation denied);
Accord, Sage v. New York, 154 N.Y. 61, 47 N.E. 1096 (1897) (Public wharves
and docks constructed on Harlem River). Cf., Slingerland v. International Con-
tracting Co., 169 N.Y. 60, 61 N.E. 995 (1901) (government contractor in course
of dredging Hudson River created spoil bank which resulted in interference with
upland owner's access; no recovery).
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itself, the courts began to have trouble. The railroad bridge cases are
illustrative. Not infrequently, building the bridge necessitated placing sup-
port piers and associated structures in the waterway. These structures some-
times blocked the upland owner's access to the channel. The fact that the
spanning of the waterway with the bridge had been approved by Congress
led some courts to conclude that the project was essentially governmental ac-
tivity in aid of navigation, and came under the rule of no compensation. 14
Other courts were singularly unimpressed by the argument. They saw no rea-
son why the upland owner should not be compensated for the loss in value
of his property resulting from an activity that had no real connection with
improving the navigability of the waterway, and that indeed usually pro-
duced the opposite result.15
Sometimes both counsel and the court became confused over the
identity of the issue involved. Was it a question of the riparian's right of
access by virtue of his upland ownership, or was it a question of the
state's title to the bed in front of the upland and its right to authorize
erections on the bed? In Tomiin v. Dubuque, B. & M. R.R.,1° defendant
railroad, under authority of a state statute permitting railroad corporations
to use, occupy, and enjoy "any lands of the state,"1 built a section of its
roadbed along the shore of the Mississippi River in front of plaintiff's
upland. The construction was below the high water mark. Plaintiff claimed
damages for destruction of his right of access, and won at the trial level.
On appeal by the railroad, plaintiff's counsel stated that,
The only question raised by this appeal is whether a riparian owner
has such an interest in land bordering on the Mississippi River
below high water mark as to entitle him to damages from a railway
company seeking to occupy it?18
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the upland owner owned only to the
high water mark, not the low water mark as contended by plaintiff's
counsel, and reversed the judgment. Confusion was further compounded
when, in the course of its opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court added lan-
guage that the upland owner on a navigable river "is entitled to no right,
14. E.g., Fish v. Chicago G.W. R.R., 125 Minn. 380, 147 N.W. 431 (1914).
15. E.g., Northern P. Ry. v. S. E. Slade Lumber Co., 61 Wash. 195, 112 P.
240 (1910); Delaplaine v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 214 (1877).
16. 32 Iowa 106 (1871).
17. Iowa Stat., tit. XI, art. 3, section 1328 (1860). The statute has since
been repealed, Ch. 35, § 2 [1874 Iowa Pub. Laws 15th Gen. Ass.
18. Quoted in Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr. Co., 238 N.W. 416 (Iowa 1931),
at 419.
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either in its shores or waters, as an incident of his ownership, except the
contingent ones of alluvion and derelictum."'19 Subsequent cases cast doubt
on the accuracy of this language, 20 and it was expressly overruled in Peck
v. Alfred Olsen Constr. Co.,2 although on rehearing the court, in a second
opinion, found the Todim case not controlling on the facts of Peck, and
declined to further consider it.22
When the "improvement" involved the rechanneling of a stream or
the diverting of its water, the courts found themselves faced with a similar
conflict. As a result of the improvement, the upland owner lost his ac-
cess; and the particular waterbody lost its navigability, or had it materially
impaired. Nevertheless, if the ultimate purpose was to improve navigation
on other waterways, some courts held the upland owner's loss noncom-
pensable.23 Other courts, finding no intent on the part of the government
to improve the channel or bed of the waterbody concerned, refused to
classify the upland owner's loss as the price of progress, and made the
government compensate him. For example, in Beidler v. Sanitary District
of Chicago,24 plaintiff owned lands abutting on and near the Chicago
River. His predecessor in title had dug large canals extending from the
river through the upland property. These canals provided navigable chan-
nels for vessels from Lake Michigan coming up the Chicago River to the
wharves and docks built along the property fronting on the canals. Plain-
tiff leased these properties, obligating himself in the leases to maintain
sufficient water in the canals for access for vessels to the leased premises.
The Sanitary District of Chicago, a governmental district organized
under state law, built a sanitary drainage canal, and connected it to the
Chicago River in order to obtain the flow of the river to carry its wastes.
As a result, the level in the river adjacent to plaintiff's upland and in his
canals was lowered six feet. Plaintiff expended some $25,000 in dredging
19. Tomlin v. Dubuque B. & M. R.R., 32 Iowa 106, 109 (1871).
20. E.g., Renwick v. Davenport & N.W. R.R., 49 Iowa 664 (1878); see also
Musser v. Hershey, 42 Iowa 356 (1876).
21. 238 N.W. 416, 420 (Iowa 1931).
22. Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131 (1932).
23. E.g., Black River Improv. Co. v. La Crosse Booming & Transp. Co., 54
Wis. 659, 11 N.W. 443 (1882) (one branch of river destroyed to improve naviga-
tion on other branch); see also Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21 (1855)
(state cut new channel, affecting plaintiff's access, rt. of access denied), aff'd sub
nom. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1859). But see King v. Vicks-
burg R. & Light Co., 88 Miss. 456, 42 So. 204 (1906) (overruled Withers because of
a change in state const.).
24. 211 Ill. 628, 71 N.E. 1118 (1904).
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the canals and rebuilding the docks and wharves to adjust for the lowered
level. He then sued the Sanitary District for his damages.
Because the canals had been supplied with water from the river for
more than 20 years, the court determined that the diversion of the water
to the canals was an appropriation of the water adverse to the rights of other
owners of abutting property, and as the appropriation did not violate the
public right of navigation, the plaintiff had acquired by prescription the
same riparian rights in the waters that he would have had if the canals
had been natural waterways. The Sanitary District argued that under the
sanitary district act the drainage channel is declared a navigable stream;
the diversion of water into the stream was in the interest of and for the
purpose of navigation; and the riparian rights of the plaintiff were subject
to the right of the government to make improvements to facilitate naviga-
tion.
The court agreed that plaintiff's private rights were subject to the
public right to improve navigation, but this meant the right to improve
navigation in the Chicago River and its tributaries, not the lowering of
the water in the river to make navigable an artificial channel for waste
carrying. The court pointed out that under the sanitary district act the pur-
pose of the district and its works was to dispose of sewage; the fact that
a navigable waterway was created was purely incidental. The court con-
cluded that the lowering of the water level obstructed ingress and egress
to the plaintiff's lots, and was a compensable injury under the state's con-
stitutional provision requiring compensation for the taking of, or damage
to, private property for public use. 25
In an interesting Iowa case the judges had some difficulty deciding
what structures could be called "in aid of navigation" until counsel for the
state helped them resolve the question by displaying some adroitness in
his presentation of the state's case.26 The state was in the process of ex-
tending a public street into West Lake Okoboji, a navigable lake, and
erecting a turn-around on pilings in the lake. The street entered the lake
at an angle, and this plus the thermometer-bulb shaped turn-around had
the effect of partially blocking plaintiff's access to the lake from his upland
25. See also Fulton Light, Heat, & P. Co. v. State, 200 N.Y. 400, 94 N.E.
199 (1911); Hewitt-Lea Lumber Co. v. King County, 113 Wash. 431, 194 P. 377
(1920) (lowering of waters of Lake Washington, in connection with ship canal
construction, left Mercer Slough dry, isolating mill from navigable part of lake);
Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Wtr. Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 P. 718 (1905).
26. Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr. Co., 238 N.W. 416 (Iowa 1931).
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amusement park adjacent to the street. Plaintiff appealed from the denial
of an injunction. A majority of the Iowa Supreme Court felt that, even
though the chief use of the structure was to be a driveway or turn-around
for automobiles, "we cannot say that the structure does not have a public
use consistent with the use by the public of the lake."27 The court then
summarily concluded that the upland owner was not entitled to compen-
sation for injury to his access, and affirmed the trial court.
Four judges dissented, vigorously pointing out that the state's con-
struction was not for the purpose of improving navigation or uses incident
to the water: "In truth, the appellees [state] propose[s] to lessen the
general and ordinary uses of the lake and prohibit the carrying on of com-
merce from appellant's [plaintiff's] land."28 A rehearing was granted the
plaintiff.29 At the rehearing, however, a new sketch of the proposed struc-
ture, labelled "Proposed Public Wharf," was submitted to the court by
the state. The sketch showed a boat-landing dock radiating from the
turn-around. The court, with the benefit of this new insight into the
project, asked itself whether the fact that the proposed wharf and boat
landing also provided a convenient turn-around for vehicular traffic pre-
vented the structure from being "in aid of navigation." The court thought
not, now all judges concurring, although two of the judges expressed grave
doubt as to the bona fides of the new label.3 0 Once having categorized the
improvement as "in aid of navigation," the Iowa court in a lengthy opinion
adopted the principle of no compensation, relying heavily on Scranton v.
Wheeler31 and other federal precedents.
II. THE RiPARIAN's RIGHT TO NAVIGATE
As to the right to navigate-to travel over the surface of the water
to distant points, whether for the purpose of transporting to market prod-
ucts grown or manufactured on riparian lands, or for the purpose of having
others reach the lands to exchange goods and services, or simply for the
purpose of pleasure boating-the riparian owner has at least the same
rights as any member of the general public. Against interference by other
individuals, the public has a protected right to navigate. But against ob-
structions erected under federal or state authority, the courts have generally
27. Id. at 422.
28. Id. at 425.
29. 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131 (1932).
30. Concurring opinion, 216 Iowa at 533, 245 N.W. at 137.
31. 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
1968]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
held that the public right to use a waterway as a highway would yield to,
other public needs when the general good required it, and the Congress
or the legislature was the final authority on what was the general good. 2
But what of the riparian owner whose accessibility to connecting net-
works of waterways may have been impaired or completely blocked by a
government-authorized structure? Was he simply a member of the public,
or did he have a protectible property right by virtue of his riparian status?
The question is raised, for example, when a government-authorized bridge
is built across a navigable waterway. As a result of the structure, ships may
no longer be able to reach a riparian owner on the upstream side of the
bridge without extensive modification to their superstructures, or perhaps
not at all.
Consistent with the federal rule of noncompensability for direct access
rights, the federal courts took the position that, as to congressionally-ap-
proved projects, there was no compensable right in the riparian for loss
of his navigation capability. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge
Co.,a3 the complaining upstream riparian was the state of Pennsylvania.
The Bridge Company, under express authority of the State of Virginia,
erected a bridge across the Ohio River at Wheeling. The bridge did not
have a draw, and the clearance was such that the usual packet boats
running the Ohio from Cincinnati to Pittsburgh could not pass under the
bridge without lowering their stacks, a not inconsiderable project.3 4 In
the Supreme Court, the Bridge Company argued that the nuisance, if
there was one, was a public nuisance, and only the sovereign within whose
jurisdiction the nuisance existed could move against it. The Supreme Court
answered that if a public nuisance was productive of a specific injury to
an individual, he had standing to complain. Pennsylvania was not suing in
its sovereign capacity, but in its capacity as an owner of property in-
terests in transportation systems extending inland from Pittsburgh. It
was alleged that the value of these systems would be materially diminished
if river traffic into Pittsburgh was hindered.38 The Court then decreed that,
32. See discussion infra, part II of this article.
33. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851), modified, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
34. See the dissenting opinion of Justice McLean, 59 U.S. at 437-39, for a
detailed description of the physical and financial problems involved.
35. In this case, the State of Pennsylvania is not a party in virtue of its
sovereignty. It does not come here to protect the rights of its citizens....
Nor can the State prosecute this suit on the ground of any remote or
contingent interest in itself. It assumes and claims, not an abstract right,
but a direct interest in the controversy, and that the power of this court,
can redress its wrongs and save it from irreparable injury. .. .
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on the facts, the bridge was an obstruction that unlawfully interfered with
plaintiff's navigation rights, and unless it was elevated to a height suffi-
cient for the packets to pass under it, or an appropriate draw constructed,
it was to be abated.36
Subsequently an act of Congress was obtained specifically declaring
the bridge to be a lawful structure in its then existing position and eleva-
tion, and authorizing the Bridge Company to maintain it as it stood. The
act further required that vessels navigating the river regulate their pipes
and chimneys so as not to interfere with the bridge. At a further hearing,
the Supreme Court ruled its earlier decree no longer enforceable; the
right of navigation upon which the decree had been based had been modified
by the Congress, and the bridge was now a lawful obstruction. "There
is no longer any interference with the enjoyment of the public right in-
consistent with law, . . .",37 Justice McLean dissented, arguing that while
Congress had the power to regulate commerce among the States, it did
not have the power to alter facts, and the facts as he saw them and as the
Court had seen them earlier, were that the bridge was an unlawful inter-
ference with Pennsylvania's riparian rights. He considered the act of
Congress void.2 8
Wheeling then seemed to stand for the proposition that an upstream
riparian owner who could show special damage from an obstruction to the
public right of navigation could challenge the lawfulness of the structure
even though it had been specifically authorized by the state legislature,
and the question of whether the riparian was damaged would be decided
by the courts. But if the structure was expressly authorized by the Congress,
its lawfulness was conclusively established, and there was no right in a ri-
parian that the federal courts could recognize. Of course, the final decision in
Wheeling dealt only with the latter point, the effect of a Congressional
declaration. Ten years later, the question of the conclusiveness of a state
legislative authorization came before the court again, and this time no
supervening Congressional act was involved.
... and so in the present case, the rights asserted and relief prayed, are
considered as in no respect different from those of an individual. From
the dignity of the State, the constitution gives to it the right to bring
an original suit in this court. And this is the only privilege, if the right
be established, which the State of Pennsylvania can claim in the present
case.
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 559 (1851).
36. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851).
37. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
421, 432 (1855).
38. Id. at 437-49.
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In Gilman v. Phviladelphia,39 Gilman, a private individual, owned a
coal wharf downstream of the Market Street Bridge over the Schuylkill
River, on the west side of Philadelphia. The Schuylkill River joined the
Delaware River below the city. Ships coming up the Delaware could turn
into the Schuylkill, and reach Gilman's coal yard. The city undertook to
build another bridge across the Schuylkill, just downstream of Gilman's
property; the bridge was specifically authorized by a state statute. The
effect of the new bridge was to bracket Gilman between the two bridges.
As the new bridge was to be built with a 30 foot clearance, and no draw,
masted ships which formerly were able to reach Gilman's property could
no longer do so. Gilman, claiming diversity of citizenship and unlawful
interference with his riparian rights, sued in a federal court to enjoin the
building of the bridge. Gilman based his position on Wheeler-there was
no doubt on the evidence that his riparian property would be materially
depreciated in value as a direct result of the new bridge.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's dismissal of Gilman's
complaint, on the ground that in the absence of relevant Congressional
action, the reserved power of the states over navigable waters was plenary,
and the exercise of the power could not be made the subject of federal
judicial review. When the question of lawfulness of the structure evapo-
rated, plaintiff's rights as a riparian went with it.40 The principle that
came out of Gilnun, then, was that the authority of a state over its nav-
igable waters, like the federal government's had been in Wheeling, was
paramount and unconditioned by private claims, at least as far as the
federal courts were concerned.
If the riparian was to have any judicial redress for losses sustained as
a result of state-authorized obstructions to navigable waterways, it would
have to come from his own state courts, and be based on a state-recognized
common law or statutory right. Because the state courts had early agreed
with the idea of their state government's paramount authority over nav-
igable waterways,41 the riparian owner, if he had no better standing than
39. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
40. Three justices dissented on the grounds that, while it was true there was
no act of Congress expressly authorizing or prohibiting the bridge, there was
relevant Congressional activity in the form of ship-licensing acts and other legisla-
tion regulating navigable waters which indicated the intent of Congress to maintain
the river as a navigable waterway. Indeed, it was this type of legislation that was
cited by the Court in the earlier decree in Wheeling as the basis for finding the
Wheeling bridge an unlawful obstruction. See also The Passaic Bridges, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 782 (1857).
41. See discussion, Part III infra.
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the general public, would be largely at the mercy of the state. The critical
question was whether the fact that he was also a riparian owner gave him
sufficiently different standing so that he could claim something more.
As a result of history and the intimate connection between the ri-
parian's problem and the problem of public navigation generally, the status
of the riparian is not a simple one. An obstruction to a navigable waterway
is a public nuisance. Being a riparian owner may be a material considera-
tion in determining whether a navigator has shown the special injury
required to be entitled to maintain an action regarding such an obstruction.
But riparian status is only one facet of the question of rights and liabilities
resulting from obstructions to navigable waters. The details of the question
are the subject of the next section.
III. NAvImATIoN-PuBLIc RIGHTS AND PRIVATE CLAIMS
A. Background and Development of the Problem
The question of whether a navigable waterway shall be kept wholly
free for navigation, or whether it shall be invaded with structures deemed
necessary to promote other public purposes, is a matter of government pol-
icy, to be decided in the first instance by the legislature. The power of
the federal government over the navigable waters of the United States is
plenary. As against private claims (or contrary state policies), the federal
policy as determined by Congress is paramount and conclusive.4 2 Fur-
thermore, federal law regards the power of the states over state waters,
when not in conflict with established federal policy, as equally paramount
and conclusive. This issue was decided at an early date in the case of
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsk Co.43 The State of Delaware had au-
thorized a dam across a navigable waterway. Because the dam completely
blocked movement up or down river, the owner of a large sloop desiring
passage broke the dam down. The company that had built the dam sued
the sloop owner in trespass; he defended on the ground that the dam was
an unlawful obstruction to public navigation. In view of the legislative
authority for the dam, the Delaware courts found the defense without merit,
and the United States Supreme Court affirmed. Said Chief Justice Marshall:
[T]he measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek,
and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have
42. See discussion, Part II supra.
43. 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 245 (1829).
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been accustomed to use it. But this abridgement, unless it comes in
conflict with the constitution or a law of the United States, is an
affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens, of
which this court can take no cognizance. 44
The enactment in 1899, of federal legislation prohibiting construction of
bridges and dams,45 and wharves and other obstructions46 in navigable
waters of the United States unless authorized by appropriate federal agency
did not change this. The requirements for federal approval are in addition
to whatever state requirements are in effect. 47
In the absence then of a conflicting federal determination, the right
of public navigation on a particular navigable waterway in a state is left
to the tender mercy of the state government. During the period of this
country's industrial development, the state legislatures, in their zeal to
establish railroads and highways and to promote water power and other
aids to industry, were not always tender, and bridges and dams were fre-
quently authorized. The state courts, with the federal precedents to guide
them and the weight of the state legislatures behind them, showed little
mercy.
A reading of the cases as the law developed is an interesting window
into the policies and politics of state government. Many of the cases that
first dealt with these problems came up in the period from 1860 to 1895.
This was the great railroad building era. A number of special legislative
acts were passed authorizing the building of a particular bridge at a des-
ignated location. More often, perhaps, the legislatures in the charters
given to railroad and bridge companies simply gave a general consent
to the erection of bridges over navigable waters of the state. Even if the
charter did not specifically mention the erection of bridges, the authority
to construct a railroad between designated points was recognized as suf-
ficient to give the railroad company the authority to erect bridges over
navigable waters. 48 But the general grant of authority to build a bridge
did not, in the eyes of some judges, include the authority to unduly ob-
struct the navigable capacity of the waterway. Some obstruction of course
was inevitable, but if a structure obstructed the waterway in excess of
44. Id. at 251.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1899).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899).
47. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 365 (1897).
48. E.g., Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Old Colony & F. R.R., 87 Mass. (5
Allen) 221 (1862). State ex rel. Pettee v. Stevens, 1 N.J. Eq. 369 (1831).
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the authority granted, it was a public nuisance, and could be abated.49
Furthermore, the obstructer became liable for injuries caused by his ob-
struction.50
The questions then became: (1) had a particular structure been prop-
erly authorized; and if so, (2) had it been constructed within the scope of
the authorization. But before these questions could be asked, a preliminary
matter had first to be determined: who was entitled to ask them? If the
answers were to be sought in a court,5 the court would want to know
whether the challenger had a legal right to an answer. If the challenger was
an appropriate state official, representing the sovereign, there was no prob-
lem. An unlawful obstruction to a navigable waterway was similar to an
unlawful obstruction to a public highway. It was a public nuisance, and
the public through its representatives was entitled to have the nuisance
abated.
More often, however, the challenger was an individual who wished to
have the waterway used for navigation, and who found the structure to be
an impediment to such use. He might have been a ship owner, making
his living transporting goods and people up and down the waterway. He
might have been an owner of a wharf used by the ships, who wanted to
keep the ships coming. He might have been a manufacturer who got his
materials and moved his products to market via the waterway. Today
he may simply be a pleasure boat owner, enjoying some of the new leisure.
The doctrine, again by analogy to the highway cases, developed that judi-
cial consideration could not successfully be sought by just any individual
who decided to become a self-appointed spokesman for the injured public.
A challenger had to show that he was special-that somehow he suffered
an injury different in kind from the public at large. The details of this
showing will be discussed more fully below.
Let us assume for the moment that the required showing has been
made. What then? Analytically, the questions then before the court were
those mentioned earlier: (1) was the structure authorized; and (2) was it
erected in compliance with the authorization. If the authorization was
general, and if the court would not read into such a general authorization
the power to substantially obstruct navigation, the court was then faced
49. E.g., State v. Freeport, 43 Me. 198 (1857) (Abatement by public official);
Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68 (1863) (Self-help).
50. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Ferguson, 105 Tenn. 552, 59 S.W. 343 (1900);
Gates v. Northern Pac. R.R. 64 Wis. 64, 24 N.W. 494 (1885).
51. For non-judicial remedies available to the individual, see Part III, sub-
section E infra.
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with determining whether the limited authorization to build, but not to
unduly obstruct, had been exceeded. This meant taking evidence on the
uses to which the waterway had customarily been put, and on the par-
ticular uses being hindered by the obstruction. When the case was brought
to the court by a private individual, as opposed to a state official, the
evidence of prior usage and resultant injury was primarily focused on the
challenger's own activities. This was also the evidence that bore on the
question of whether the challenger had the special injury needed to en-
title him to bring the challenge. As a result, the early cases are a curious
blend of facts and issues. It is sometimes hard to tell whether the chal-
lenger lost because he did not show the special injury needed to challenge
or because his injury, if any, was dammum absque injuria in the absence
of a showing of undue obstruction. When the challenger won, the same
evidence that proved special injury also established that the structure
was an unreasonable obstruction to navigation and thus exceeded the legisla-
tive authorization.
In the following analysis, based on early cases as well as some of the
more recent ones, an attempt will be made to isolate the operative variables
which appear to have become significant. The cited cases at least are con-
sistent with the thesis stated, and in most instances directly support it.
It must be emphasized, however, that the tendency on the part of counsel
and courts to blend the issues into a confused amalgam requires some dis-
tortion in the process of separating them.
B. Showing Special Iqury-Tke Commercial Navigator
The fact that the challenger makes his living transporting goods and
people up and down the waterway, and that his business will to some
degree be injured because of the obstruction, does not appear to be enough
to entitle him to judicial challenge. For example, a steamboat operator
could not maintain a suit to recover damages for interruption of his
general transportation business on a river obstructed by a railroad bridge,
since all who navigated the river were exposed to the very same injury.53
But what if the navigator has a contract to transport certain goods, and
52. See, e.g., Depew v. Board of Trustees, 5 Ind. 8 (1854); Hamilton v.
Vicksburg S. & P. R.R. 34 'La. Ann. 970 (1882). But see Southern Ry. v. Ferguson,
supra note 50 (recovery allowed when legislative authorization did not extend to
bridge that interfered with navigation).
53. South Carolina Steamboat Co. v. Wilmington C. & A.R.R., 46 S.C. 327,
24 S.E. 337 (1896). But see Gates v. Northern Pac. R.R., supra note 50 (recovery
allowed on similar facts; bridge held an unreasonable obstruction).
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the obstruction prevents him from doing so? In a Maine case in which
the plaintiff contracted to carry sand and ballast down river, and the
defendant's boom blocked the river, the court found the plaintiff had suf-
fered a special injury.54 On almost identical facts the Minnesota Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion,5 5 although in a later Minnesota
case the court thought the decision was probably wrong. 0 In the latter
case, the Minnesota court noted that there was a marked conflict as to
what constitutes special injury and that the adjudicated cases were irrecon-
cilable. In that case, the plaintiff's logs were blocked by an obstruction
created by another logger. The obstruction was a public nuisance and the
court seemed to liberalize the special injury requirement:
It would be highly unjust and inequitable to say that he has no
right of redress in a private action, on the ground, merely, that the
injury had resulted from an act which is a public offense in itself,
and because other persons might have been injured and damaged in
the same manner and to the same extent, had they met the obstruc-
tion under like circumstances. 57
C. Showing Special InJury-The Riparian Owner
A number of the cases involve upstream riparian owners who, as a
result of the construction downstream of a bridge or dam, can no longer
carry on their customary activities in connection with the waterway. The
cases here are equally in conflict, and some of them are equally irreconcilable.
It is possible to make some sense of the area, however, as long as it is rec-
ognized that for every case that supports one view of the problem another
case with equally vague facts can be found suggesting a different view.
The mere fact that the upstream owner's potential accessibility to
other waters has been hindered or even destroyed does not seem to be
enough to establish a special injury. The fact that at some future time
he planned to develop his property with wharves and docks, or that at
some time in the past the property was so used, is too speculative as an
injury.58
If the upstream owner can show that navigation on the river is
presently an important aspect of his business, additional considerations
54. Dudley v. Kennedy, 63 Me. 465 (1874) (obstruction unauthorized).
55. Brennan v. Lammers, 46 Minn. 209, 48 N.W. 766 (1891) (contract
entered into with knowledge of the obstruction).
56. Page v. Mille Lacs Lumber Co., 53 Minn. 492, 55 N.W. 608 (1893).
57. Id. at 609.
58. E.g., Potter v. Indiana & L.M. Ry., 95 Mich. 389, 54 N.W. 956 (1893).
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must be examined. Evidence of the extent to which navigation to his
premises has been hampered becomes relevant, not to the separate issue
of compliance with the authorization to construct, but to the question of
whether there has been a special injury. Thus, when the evidence showed
that the structure had not blocked the river in any material way the chal-
lenger failed to establish his right to challenge.59 But when the upper
owner has established that the blockage was substantially complete, at
least to the extent of keeping boats from servicing his property, and that
as a result he has suffered losses, he has been allowed to recover.60 In one
case,01 a brickyard owner sued defendant railroad for loss of use of his
boats and loss of profits on his sales resulting from defendant's bridge ob-
structing the river downstream. Defendant's demurrer was overruled-since
the plaintiff was shut off from the channels of trade, he had established
his allegation of special damages. In another case, 2 involving a manufac-
turing concern that could no longer transport needed material in its boats
from its downstream property to its property above defendant's bridge,
judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on the liability issue, although re-
manded for a redetermination of the damages. The court allowed damages
for loss of use of the boat, for the wages of the crew, and-if the plaintiff
had transported the goods by other means-for the reasonable cost of
such transportation. The plaintiff, however, left the cargo exposed and the
resulting injury was held not to have been caused by the defendant's ob-
struction. Defendant's argument that plaintiff should be considered merely
a commercial navigator because he also used his boats as common carriers
was given short shrift by the court.
The legislature may relieve the complainant of his burden of proving
59. Chicago & Pacific R.R. v. Stein, 75 Ill. 41 (1874) (testimony indicated
boats could still dock); Harvard College v. Stearns, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 1 (1860)(no actual hinderance or obstruction shown); Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17
N.H. 200 (1845) (no showing that navigation was obstructed); Marine Air Ways
v. State, 201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct. of Cl. 1951), aff'd, 116 N.Y.S.2d
778 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1952).
60. Frink v. Lawrence, 20 Conn. 117 (1849) (defendant's piles obstructed
access to plaintiff's wharf); Rogers v. Kennebec & Portland R.R., 35 Me. 319(1853) (railroad culvert blocked plaintiff's logs); Stofilet v. Estes, 104 Mich. 208,
62 N.W. 347 (1895) (reconstructed bridge cut off use of stream); Hickok v. Hine,
23 Ohio St. 523 (1872) (reconstructed bridge would prevent access to plaintiff's
warehouse and landing, injunction granted); Barnes v. City of Racine, 4 Wis. 474
(1854) (same, injunction granted).
61. Mehrhof Bros. Brick Mfg. Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 51 N.J.L. 56,
16 Ad. 12 (1888).
62. Farmer's Coop. Mfg. Co. v. Albemarle and Raleigh R.R., 117 N.C. 579, 23
S.E. 43 (1895). See also Armistead v. Shreveport and Red River Valley R.R. 108
La. 171, 32 So. 456 (1901).
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special injury. A statute may give a riparian owner a cause of action against
an unauthorized obstruction;6 3 it may give a navigator liquidated damages
of 10 dollars per day for delays caused by a dam; 4 or it may be construed
to require the payment of the expense incurred by steamboats in installing
hinges on the smokestacks so as to permit the boats to pass under the
bridge. 5
Another factor that seems to have influenced the outcome of some
cases, in addition to a showing of substantial injury to business interests,
is the proximity of the obtruction to the riparian's property. A bridge with
its abutments placed in the water immediately in front of a riparian's
property may be a question of access and an interference with recognized
property rights, whereas the same bridge downstream may become merely
a matter of navigation, even though the bridge in either location effectively
blocks the riparian's accessibility to other waters.66
At what point does the obstruction cease being a matter of public
nuisance, and become a question of private rights? What of an obstruction
placed across the narrow upper reaches of a river immediately below a
riparian's property? In Leitck v. Sanitary District of Chicago,6 7 plaintiffs,
who owned property on the Chicago River, sued to enjoin the Sanitary
District and the City of Chicago from building a bridge and sewer and
water mains across the river downstream of their property. Plaintiffs al-
leged that the river was navigable up to their property, and had been used
for years for waterway transportation to and from plaintiffs' docks and
wharves. They further alleged that the mains built across the bed of the
river and the bridge built over the river would destroy navigation to their
property. It appeared that the structures were to be built immediately
downstream and adjacent to the plaintiffs' land.
Plaintiffs first brought their action in the federal court, but the court
held it was without jurisdiction over the case, and this was affirmed on ap-
peal.68 Plaintiffs then went to the state court; the trial court dismissed
63. Bailey v. Philadelphia Wilmington and Baltimore R.R., 4 Del. 389 (1846)
(holding such a statute constitutional even though enacted after the injury but
holding a statute giving a cause of action against authorized obstructions unconsti-
tutional as a violation of obligation of contract).
64. Hogg v. Zanesville Canal & Manufacturing Co., 5 Ohio 410 (1832) (held
plaintiff not limited to statutory damage when his boat was lost).
65. State v. South Carolina R.R., 28 S.C. 23, 4 S.E. 796 (1888).
66. For an opinion clearly recognizing the importance of this distinction,
see Marine Air Ways v. State, 201 Misc. 350, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (Ct. of Cl.
1951), aff'd, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (App. Div. 3a. Dept. 1952).
67. 369 Ill. 469, 17 N.E.2d 34 (1938).
68. Leitch v. City of Chicago, 41 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1930).
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their complaint. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action. "[T]he plaintiffs stated facts
which give them certain valuable rights as riparian owners on running
water; . . .defendants were doing acts which impaired those rights."' 9 The
court did not clarify exactly what kind of rights were involved, whether
rights of access or of navigation. The case was remanded and later tried.
At the trial, after hearing, the chancellor found against the plaintiffs, and
again dismissed the complaint. The evidence at the trial established that
the bridge was built by the State of Illinois. The State had been a party
defendant at the trial level, but had been dismissed for reasons not given.
Evidence further established that the removal of only the sewer and water
main structures would not benefit the plaintiffs, as the bridge would still
constitute a permanent obstruction to shipping. On appeal, in view of the
fact that the defendants then before the court did not have jurisdiction over
the bridge, the court declined to issue an injunction since it felt that an
order that would require the mains to be removed would have been useless
under the circumstances.70
The same problem arises when the riparian owner's land is on a cove
or basin, and the cove opens into a substantially larger body of water. In
an early Iowa case a fish camp owner had his place of business at one
end of a long (5-6 mile), narrow lake. A railroad bridge located one mile
from the fish camp had been constructed in such a way as to block the
fish camp owner's customers from reaching the remainder of the lake in
their boats. The Iowa court held that the camp owner had no basis for
recovery for the obstruction of public navigation.7 1 Perhaps the mile-long
stretch of lake available to him was enough to keep the fish camp operator
in business.
In a recent Florida case, another fish camp operator felt his situation
was substantially different, and the court agreedY2 Mr. Giddens had pur-
chased a parcel of land located on a small arm of a navigable landlocked
body of water. He set himself up in the business of renting boats to people
who came to fish. To reach the main part of the lake his customers
passed under a wooden state highway bridge that stretched across the arm
of the lake. The State Road Department, in the course of improving the
highway, removed the wooden bridge and built a fill completely spanning
69. 369 Ill. 469, 475, 17 N.E.2d 34, 37.
70. Leitch v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 386 Ill. 433, 54 N.E.2d 458 (1944).
71. Innis v. Cedar Rapids, I.F. & N.W. Ry., 76 Iowa 165, 40 N.W. 701 (1888).
(The court noted the additional factor that the fish camp operation had not
been started until four or five years after the bridge was built).
72. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1955).
[Vol. 33
PUBLIC RIGHT OF NAVIGATION
the area and effectively blocking Giddens and his customers from the
main part of the lake.7 3 Giddens sought a declaratory judgment as to his
right to access from his land to the main body of the lake. The chancellor
rejected the Road Department's argument that Giddens' riparian rights
ended when he reached the water from his uplands, and decreed that he
had the legal right to access to the main body of the lake for purposes of
fishing, hunting, and boating. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court,
citing an earlier Florida case74 for the proposition that one of the common
law riparian rights was the right of ingress and egress to and from the
water over the owner's land, stated that the question before the Court
was whether the denial of ingress and egress deprived Giddens of "a prac-
tical incident of his riparian proprietorship." 75 The court held that Gid-
dens' right of ingress and egress would be virtually meaningless unless he
were allowed access to the main body of the lake. The decree of the lower
court was affirmed. 76
D. Legal Autkorization as a Variable
One of the major factors that determines the rights and liabilities
in regard to obstructions in navigable waters is the extent to which the
obstruction has been authorized. There are three key questions: (1) has
the obstruction been authorized; (2) what is the extent of the authorization;
and (3) has the structure been built in conformity to the authorization?
If a structure or other object obstructs the navigability of the water,
and the obstruction is without any legal authority, it is a public nuisance
and the state may abate it 7 7 or bring a criminal action against the person
creating the nuisance.7 8 A private individual who has sustained special
injury may also bring an action to abate or enjoin the nuisance 0 or to re-
cover damages caused by the obstruction. 0
73. The road across the arm of the lake contained a large culvert connecting
the arm with the main lake, but the trial court specifically found that the culvert
did not provide a practical means of access by boat; the culvert was apparently
completely submerged for about 18 months after it was installed.
74. Thiesen v. Gulf F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918).
75. 82 So.2d 743, 745.
76. See also Easton & A. R.R. v. Central R.R., 52 N.J.L. 267, 19 At. 722(1890). Contra, Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 51 Adt. 806 (1901)
(Federal authorization of bridge blocking egress from cove was controlling).
77. State v. Freeport, 43 Me. 198 (1857).
78. See State v. Godfrey, 24 Me. 232, 41 Am. Dec. 382 (1844).
79. Frink v. Lawrence, 20 Conn. 117 (1849).
80. Gulf Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Becker County Sand & Gravel Co., 122 F.
Supp. 13 (E.D.N.C. 1954); see Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. 176 Md. 197,
4 A.2d 757 (1939) (dictum).
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If the obstruction has some basis of legal authority, the problem be-
comes more difficult. As noted previously, the courts have generally rec-
ognized that, absent a preempting federal position, the state legislature
has plenary power to partially or completely obstruct an otherwise nav-
igable river.8 ' The theory is that the legislature determines the policy that
best promotes the public interest and "its decision is wholly political, and
its policy may not be reviewed. 8s 2
What is the effect of authorization? A bridge or dam which blocks
or impedes navigation may give a riparian owner or navigator a cause of
action on the theory that the obstruction is a public nuisance and that he,
in some manner, has sustained a special injury differing in kind and degree
from the public at large.8 3 If, however, the complainant fails to prove that the
obstruction is unauthorized or that it exceeds the authorization, his injury
is dam um absque injuria because that which is legally authorized cannot
be a public nuisance.8 4 The apparent harshness of this doctrine is softened
by judicial construction of the authorizing statutes and sometimes by the
express terms of the statutes. When the legislature authorizes a bridge or
other impediment and the authorization is couched in general terms, the
courts have been unwilling to construe such authorization to permit an
obstruction to the navigable capacity of the waterway. In Hickock v. Hine,s 5
a plank road company was incorporated by special act of the legislature
with power to construct a road with all "necessary appurtenances and ap-
pendages, doing no unnecessary damage."8 6 As against a claim by a riparian
owner that his warehouse and landing would be blocked by a proposed
bridge, the court held that the power to obstruct navigation must be
expressly granted and, in the absence of such a grant, a statute confers
no power to obstruct the navigability of a river. There is then no implied
authority to obstruct a navigable river.8 7 In addition, the complainant may
81. E.g., Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1882); Selman v. Wolfe
27 Tex. 68 (1863). But see Depew v. Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8 (1854) (lim-
iting power over interstate streams to reasonable obstructions).
82. St. Regis Paper Co. v. New Hampshire Water R. Board., 92 N.H. 164,
174, 26 A.2d 832, 840 (1942).
83. For a discussion of what constitutes special injury see discussion part III,
subsections B and C supra.
84. Milnor v. New Jersey R.R., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 782 (1857); Rogers v.
Kennebec & Portland R.R., 35 Me. 319 (1853); Wood v. Rice, 24 Mich. 422 (1872);
Woodward v. Webb, 65 Pa. 254 (1870); Ensworth v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 320(1866).
85. 23 Ohio St. 523 (1872).
86. Id. at 529.
87. Terre-Haute Drawbridge Co. v. Halliday, 4 Ind. 36 (1852) (corporate
charter does not authorize obstruction); Thompson v. Paterson & Hudson River
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find support if the legislature has specifically recognized a stream as nav-
igable and made the obstruction of navigable streams a misdemeanor. In
this situation, a special act authorizing a bridge, without expressly au-
thorizing obstruction, will not be construed to permit an obstruction of the
river.88
A common type of authorization statute, and the one that affords
the complainant the best opportunity to recover, provides for construction
of a particular bridge or dam and then contains an express caveat that the
structure be designed so as not to obstruct navigation. Under such a statute,
the court will consider the evidence to determine if, in fact, the structure
does unreasonably obstruct navigation. To the extent that the bridge or
dam exceeds the authorization the structure is a public nuisance.8s To
illustrate this point, in an early Ohio case90 the defendant was authorized
to construct a dam provided that the dam contain a lock which would be
opened without delay, and that the dam be kept in repair so as not to im-
pede navigation. The court interpreted the statute to say to the defendant:
"you may build your dam, construct your lock and canal. You shall do it
in a particular manner. But you do it at your own peril." 91 The plaintiff
brought an action for damages when, because sand and driftwood made it
impossible to open the lock, he lost his boat going over the dam. A
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground that the defend-
ant, in violating the statute, had created a public nuisance.
There is another alternative that might be open to the complainant.
An authorization statute, with or without the caveat of not impairing
R.R., 9 N.J. Eq. 526 (1853) (slight obstruction is never a nuisance but authority
to substantially impair navigation must be express); New York v. Brooklyn
Borough Gas Co., 201 Misc. 672, 105 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (power to
lay gas pipes and do all things necessary for supplying gas does not give by implica-
tion the power to obstruct navigation); Southern Ry. v. Ferguson, 105 Tenn. 552,
59 S.W. 343 (1900) (general authority to build bridges does not confer power to
seriously interfere with navigation).
88. Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68 (1863).
89. Rogers v. Kennebec & Portland R.R., 35 Me. 319, 319 (1853) (bridge
authorized, "provided said bridge or causeway shall be so constructed as not to
obstruct or impede the navigation of said waters,"); State v. Godfrey, 24 Me.
232, 41 Am. Dec. 382, 234 (1844) (dam authorized, "provided ...free passage
... shall not be impaired, lessened or impeded," Easton and McMahon v. New
York Long Branch R.R., 24 N.J. Eq. 49, 51 (1873) (authorization for a bridge
provided "suitable and sufficient draws should be made . . .so as not to obstruct
the navigation thereof,"); Ensworth v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 320, 322 (1866)(provided in act authorizing dam that such dam "shall not obstruct or impede the
navigation").
90. Hogg v. Zanesville Canal and Mfg. Co., 5 Ohio 410 (1832).
91. Id. at 417.
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navigation, may provide with some specificity that the bridge or dam
be built in a particular manner. The plaintiff can then challenge the
structure as not being built in accordance with the statute. Thus, where
the statute calls for the bridge to be built so that the draw and piers
are "on a line with the course of river," a navigator may obtain an injunc-
tion against the construction of a proposed bridge whose draw and piers
were to be placed at an angle to the current, thereby impairing navigation.92
Similarly, a navigator may question the height of a bridge as being lower
than required by statute,93 or he may contend that a dam was built higher
than authorized by statute;94 but he bears the burden of proof and his
suit must fail unless he clearly establishes that the structure is unauthorized
as constructed. 5
E. Alternative to Judicial Relief: Self-Help
There was little question at common law that one who sustained
special injury from an obstruction to navigation which constituted a public
nuisance had the right to peaceably abate the obstruction by his own
action, and would incur no liability thereby so long as he exercised
reasonable care and abated no more of the obstruction than was necessary
for the enjoyment of his lawful rights. 6 The right of an individual to re-
move obstructions impeding the public's right to navigability is considered
analogous to the right to remove obstructions erected upon the public
highways and has long been recognized at common law as a proper remedy
to abate a public nuisance.
92. Thompson v. Paterson and Hudson River R.R., 9 N.J. Eq. 526 (1853).
See also Stephens & Condit Transp. Co. v. Central R.R., 34 NJ.L. 280 (1870), for
a similar factual issue.
93. State v. So. Carolina R.R., 28 S.C. 23, 4 S.E. 796 (1888) (42 ft. minimum
height required even when height of river bed rose).
94. Arpin v. Bowman, 83 Wis. 54, 53 N.W. 151 (1892) (legal height 3 ft.
above low water mark; dam 6 ft. above low water mark illegal and a nuisance.)
95. Silver v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 101 Mo. 79, 13 S.W. 410 (1890). See also
Bowes v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 857 (1954).
96. See, e.g., McLean v. Mathews, 7 Ill. App. 599 (1880) (defendants re-
moved plaintiff's half sunken boat which was obstructing navigation upon the
Chicago River); Marion v. Tuell, 111 Me. 566, 90 A. 484 (1914) (defendant, a
logger, damaged plaintiff's bridge by using dynamite to loosen a log jam caused
by the pins of the bridge which spanned a navigable river); Arundel v. M'Culloch,
10 Mass. 70 (1813) (defendants removed or damaged portions of bridges in order
to navigate their boats upon navigable streams); State v. Parott, 71 N.C. 311
(1874); Beach v. Schoff, 28 Pa. 195 (1857) (defendant, raft runner, removed por-
tion of plaintiff's raft which obstructed the passage of his raft upon a navigable
stream); Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68 (1863).
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It is a settled principle of the common law, that whatever ob-
structs travel in public highways and navigable streams is a com-
mon or public nuisance, which may be removed and abated by any
of the King's subjects.97
Thus, in Marion v. Tuell, s a logger successfully defeated an action
for damages which he inflicted upon a public bridge by alleging that the
bridge constituted a public nuisance. He maintained that the bridge had
impeded the flow of his logs, and that his use of dynamite to loosen the
jam from the pins of the bridge was reasonable and necessary to enable
him to enjoy his lawful use of the river. The court said,
The true theory of abatement of nuisance is that an individual
citizen may abate a private nuisance injurious to him, when he
could also bring an action; and also, when a common nuisance ob-
structs his individual right; he may remove it to enable him to
enjoy that right, and he cannot be called in question for so
doing.99
What constitutes an "obstruction" of "his individual right" has not been
interpreted as broadly as the above statement might indicate, however,
for it seems to be an established principle that:
a public nuisance can be abated by a public officer, except where
the party who desires to abate it has some special interest in the
abatement which is different from and greater than the interest
of the community.100
Another court has said, "A mere intermeddler, who has no occasion to
intervene for the protection of substantial rights of his own" cannot justify
his abatement of a nuisance by a mere showing that a public nuisance in
fact exists.110
97. McLean v. Mathews, 7 Ill. App. 599, 602 (1880).
98. 111. Me. 566 (1914).
99. Id. at 571-2, quoting from Brown v. Perkins, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 89,
101 (1858).
100. Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 350 (1900) (emphasis added). See also
Larson v. Furlong, 50 Wis. 681, 8 N.W. 1 (1881) (defendant, a competing dock
owner, held liable for the removal of plaintiff's dock which extended into waters of
a navigable lake on the grounds that even if the dock constituted a public nuisance
he was not individually injured).
101. Toothaker v. Winslow, 61 Me. 123, 131 (1872) (emphasis added) (de-
fendant who hoisted gate on a dam thereby reducing the level of water behind the
dam to the plaintiff's injury alleged the dam constituted a public nuisance which
he as a member of the public could summarily abate).
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A private nuisance is generally distinguishable from a public nuisance
in that a private nuisance exists only where one sustains an injury to a
right which he alone enjoys by virtue of an interest in land. But it has
also been recognized that "a public nuisance may also become a private
nuisance as to any person who is especially injured by it to any extent
beyond the injury to the public.' 0 2
It would thus appear that the right to exercise the non-judicial remedy
of self-help to abate a public nuisance only arises when the public nuisance
becomes a private nuisance to the one seeking to abate it. In effect, the
remedy of self-help to abate a public nuisance cannot embrace any greater
rights than could be enforced by the individual through a judicial proceed-
ing. The self-helper, when faced with a subsequent suit challenging his
actions, must therefore bear the burden of justifying them by showing
that a public nuisance existed and also that he was specially injured.
What constitutes a special injury is not altogether clear or easily
predicted in any particular instance. The requirement of showing a special
injury to justify the exercise of self-help would appear to render the remedy
a risky proposition in all but the most clear circumstances. The risks in-
herent in exercising self-help to abate a nuisance are further increased when-
ever the obstruction impeding navigation consists of a governmentally
authorized structure. The question of whether such authorization has
diminished or abrogated public navigation rights is crucial to the self-
helper's justification for removing the obstruction, for if no public rights
exist he will be held responsible for any damages he might cause.'
03
The nature of self-help naturally gives rise to other limitations on
its lawful use. The common law right to abate a nuisance extends only to
such acts as are reasonable and necessary to enable the individual to en-
joy his lawful rights.'0 4 The self-helper has a duty, "to do as little damage
as was consistent with the accomplishment of his purpose ... , to do only
what was reasonable and necessary to attain his end."'1 5 Failure to use
102. Mitchell Realty v. West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 372, 199 N.W. 390, 397 (1924).
103. See, e.g., Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 105
(1829) discussed supra. It was held that state authorization to construct a dam
across a navigable stream abrogated the public rights to navigation and a self-
helper had no justification for abating this obstruction. But see State v. Parrott,
71 N.C. 311 (1874); Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68 (1863). Despite governmental
authorization of bridges, self-helpers were justified in removing those portions
which obstructed the navigation of their boats.
104. Liles v. Cawthorn, 78 Miss. 559 (1900) (defendant, mill owner, completely
destroyed lower riparian mill owner's dam which was interfering with the operation
of his mill).
105. Marion v. Tuell, 111 Me. 566, 572, 90 A. 484, 486 (1914).
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reasonable care, or doing more damage than is necesary to enable the self-
helper to exercise his rights, may subject him to liability. 0 6 The proper
exercise of self-help does not appear to encompass the right to breach the
peace or use force to abate a public nuisance, and there is some authority
for the proposition that an innocent person injured as a result of a self-
helper's actions may have a cause of action against him. 07
The number of "ifs" inherent in the exercise of self-help mitigates
against its conscious use as a remedy to abate a suspected nuisance. Its
principal value would appear to be an after-the-fact defense and even for
this purpose its real worth is doubtful at best. Self-help has all but disap-
peared from the modem cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the historical context of the shift from an eighteenth century
agrarian economy utilizing water-oriented transportation to a twentieth
century industrial empire built on high-speed land transport, the low
priority status given to inland navigation by the legislatures perhaps made
good sense. The unwillingness of the courts to become involved in balanc-
ing the rights of the individual navigator against this legislative policy is
also understandable, and suggestive of sound judicial restraint.
Today, however, the social, political, and economic context is quite
different. The new leisure has re-created a significant social demand for
unobstructed navigation on the nation's lakes and rivers. Recreational
boating has become a national pastime, as well as a major industry.
Waterfront residences are objects of demand and acquire high value,
largely because of their immediate access to networks of waterways.
At the same time, the resolution of conflicts between the navigators
and the obstructors no longer remains a matter of clear legislative policy.
Frequently the decision is made today by administrative agencies-the
highway engineers, the flood control district planners. The natural tendency
is for the agency to choose the simplest, and therefore the cheapest, way
to achieve its agency purpose. Little balancing of other significant social
interests, and even less consideration of private concerns, may occur. If
a reweighing of the affected interests is to take place, it may well be that
the courts will have to accept a more active role.
106. E.g., Beach v. Schoff, 28 Pa. 195 (1857); Marion v. Tuell, supra note 105;
Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68 (1863).
107. Porter v. Allen, 8 Ind. 1 (1856), (defendant removed obstruction, a large
log, and five years later plaintiff's boat ran upon the log where the defendant had
placed it and was sunk).
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This point is well illustrated by a recent decision in Florida, a state in
which waterborne recreational interests are of undoubted social and eco-
nomic importance. Carnazi v. Board of County Comcmissioners'0 s presented
the question of whether cutting off access by boat to Biscayne Bay from
waterfront property on Little River was a deprivation of a property right.
Little River is a navigable stream running through the City of Miami and
emptying into Biscayne Bay. Dade County had previously constructed a
dam across the river some distance upstream from the point where the
river joins Biscayne Bay. The effect of the dam was to block egress by
boat to the bay for any riparian owners upstream of the dam. It also pre-
vented passage up or down the river past the site of the dam for any
members of the public. In 1956, two owners of property above the dam
brought suit against the county for an adjudication of their rights and
for damages. 10 While the suit was pending, the Central and Southern
Florida Flood Control District, a state agency,110 petitioned to intervene.
The Flood Control District proposed to construct a salt water intrusion
dam across Little River considerably further downstream. The petition
was granted, and additional parties-the riparian owners along the stretch
of the river between the old county dam and the site of the new district
dam-were impleaded. In its final decree the trial court found no encroach-
ment upon the property rights of these "riparian owners."
The district court of appeal"' distinguished the riparian owner's right
to launch his boat in the water immediately adjacent to his property from
his right to navigate. He had no private right to navigate on public waters;
his right to navigate was a public right which accrued to him because he was
a member of the public and not because of any particular riparian status
that he might have. Once the district court concluded that the plaintiff's
rights were in fact merely public rights, it dealt summarily with them.
The court stated, "[I]t has long been recognized that governmental func-
tions, although they may deprive private interests of certain privileges,
are justified as a necessary exercise of the police power for the benefit
of the public."" 2 Yet the only statement in the opinion concerning the
necessity for this exercise was that "the necessity for the dam has been
108. 108 So.2d 318 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
109. This suit was eventually dismissed at the trial level.
110. FLA. STAT., §§ 378.1 to 378.51 (1959).
111. An appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, which held that it
was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the cause was transferred to
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
112. 108 So.2d 318, 323 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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found to be in the public interest by a solemn pronouncement of the Con-
gress of the United States.""13
It may be true that the solemnity with which Congress acts is a
consideration, but it seems equally true that before the citizens of Florida
or any other state are deprived of the use of the state's navigable waterways,
other factors should also be considered. Even assuming that the salt-water
intrusion problem in the Little River area is serious enough to warrant
interference with public navigation-and there appears to be ample evi-
dence that this is the casell 4 -there is nothing in the Carmazi opinion to
indicate that consideration was given to finding alternatives which would
strike a balance between the competing interests. One alternative might
have been to require the Flood Control District to provide a means for
boats to bypass the dam. Such structures are familiar parts of the Florida
waterscape." 5 This requirement could properly have been made a condition
to the withholding from the riparians of the broader relief of prohibiting
the dam." 6
There are undoubtedly other alternatives that could have been ex-
plored. But the basic question remains: in which forum can they be ex-
plored? So long as special purpose agencies are given general grants to act
in ways which significantly affect other important social interest, as here,
it would appear that the courts have an obligation to provide an effective
forum-before the fact, not after-for adjusting the tensions between
these interests.
113. Ibid.
114. See WATER REsouRcEs OF SOUTHEASTERN FLORIDA 580-91 and plate 17(1955) (Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 1255), documenting the steadily
worsening condition of the ground water supply in the Miami area.
115. See WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT BY THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF EN-
GINEERS IN FLORIDA 13 (1959) (Okeechobee Waterway, Oklawaha River).
116. For cases granting analogous partial relief see City of Lakeland v. State
ex rel. Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940); National Container Corp. v.
State, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939).
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